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Can governments successfully combat bureaucratic corruption by “hiring integrity” from 
the private sector? This paper examines the impact of hiring private firms to collect information 
for government anti-corruption efforts. In the past two decades, a number of developing countries 
have hired private firms to conduct preshipment inspections of imports, generating data that 
governments can use to fight corruption in customs agencies. I find that countries implementing 
such inspection programs subsequently experience large increases in the growth rate of import 
duties, by 6 to 8 percentage points annually. By contrast, the growth rate of other tax revenues 
does not change appreciably. Additional evidence suggests that declines in customs corruption 
are behind the import duty improvements: the programs also lead to increases in imports 
(potentially reflecting lower bribe payments) and to declines in mis-reporting of goods 
classifications. Historically, this hired integrity appears to have been cost-effective: accumulated 
improvements in import duty collections in the fifth year of a typical inspection program were 
roughly 5 times accumulated costs. 
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Foundation. 1 Introduction
Corruption is pervasive in developing countries, and is widely cited as a major barrier to economic
development.1 Rent-seeking entails substantial e¢ ciency costs (Krueger 1974), and the need for
secrecy in corrupt dealings can lead to distortions in government policy (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
Corruption in the tax authority raises the marginal cost of public funds, and may necessitate more
distortionary methods of public ￿nance (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998). If international
trade is an important conduit for growth-enhancing technology transfers (as in Grossman and
Helpman 1991), corruption in customs may reduce economic growth by inhibiting such transfers.2
For these and other reasons, poor economic development and growth performance at the country
level is frequently attributed to corruption.3
There is little systematic empirical evidence on the e⁄ectiveness of speci￿c approaches to
combating corruption. Starting with Becker and Stigler (1974), theoretical work has proposed a
number of remedies for bureaucratic corruption, such as increased monitoring and higher wages.4
But there are many reasons to be pessimistic about the e¢ cacy of anti-corruption reforms. Con-
sider, for example, attempts to monitor corrupt o¢ cials more closely. The individual monitors
themselves might also be corrupt, and so not provide useful information to higher authorities.
Even if lower-level monitors are honest, higher-level authorities might themselves be corrupt and
so tolerate or participate in the corrupt dealings.5 Empirical work is necessary to determine the
e⁄ectiveness of any given anti-corruption e⁄ort.
When there are suspicions that lower-level agents who are monitoring corrupt activity may
themselves be corrupt, higher authorities may ￿nd it appealing to rely on private ￿rms as monitors.
For example, securities regulators typically require that the ￿nancial statements of publicly-
traded ￿rms be audited by certi￿ed accounting ￿rms. Hiring private ￿rms to monitor corrupt
activity may make sense if competition among the private monitors generates strong incentives
for integrity. Can "hiring integrity" from the private sector to collect information for government
anti-corruption e⁄orts be e⁄ective?
This paper is the ￿rst empirical analysis of an anti-corruption reform involving hired integrity.
1For recent overviews of the relationship between corruption and development, see Bardhan (1997) and Rose-
Ackerman (2004).
2See, for example, Romer (1994).
3For example, Mauro (1995) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). See also Glaeser and Saks
(2004) on corruption and growth among U.S. states.
4Recent contributions in this vein include Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1992 and 1995),
and Polinsky and Shavell (2001).
5This point is made by Cadot (1987), Chand and Moene (1999), and Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003).
1It focuses on a customs reform attempted by dozens of developing countries. Within a developing
country government, the customs agency￿ the organization responsible for taxation of imported
goods￿ is often singled out as having particularly severe problems with bureaucratic corruption.
A corrupt customs bureaucracy may turn over to the government treasury only a fraction of
monies collected from importers, simultaneously falsifying import documentation to mask the
revenue theft. In addition, customs may delay incoming shipments (often under the pretext of
problems in import documentation) to extract bribes from importers, potentially discouraging
import trade.6 The net result may be less import duty revenue than would have been collected
in the absence of corruption. Such revenue drains can have important consequences, as customs
duties are important for public ￿nances in the developing world: in 1990, the midpoint year in the
sample used in this paper￿ s analysis, customs duties accounted for an average of 23% of central
government revenue across developing countries.7
In the past two decades, over 50 developing countries have tried a speci￿c approach to ￿ghting
customs corruption and raising import duty collections: hiring private ￿rms to conduct preship-
ment inspection of imports (known as PSI). When a government implements a PSI program,
foreign inspectors verify the tari⁄ classi￿cation and value of individual incoming shipments be-
fore they leave their origin countries, and forward this information to the client government. In
nearly all cases, however, the responsibility for collecting customs duties remains in the hands of
the importing country￿ s customs o¢ cials. Client governments seek to take advantage of the in-
spection ￿rms￿reputation for honesty, essentially "hiring integrity" from private ￿rms to provide
objective data on the contents of imported shipments.
There are various channels through which preshipment inspections can reduce the incentives
for customs corruption, and eventually lead to higher import duty collections. First, PSI is an
improvement in the monitoring ability of higher-level enforcers: it generates an independent source
of information that higher levels of government can use to discover and prosecute corrupt practices
by customs o¢ cers and importers. In the absence of PSI, uncovering corruption in customs
requires time-consuming investigative work, and is made particularly di¢ cult by the large number
of separate import transactions. PSI helps investigators identify import transactions where duties
(as calculated from the PSI report) diverge substantially from duties actually collected by customs
o¢ cials, suggesting that investigations should be targeted at such transactions. Second, the
6However, it is also possible that importers may end up paying less than the legislated tari⁄s on their imports
due to corruption, in which case corruption could encourage imports.
7The sample is described in Section 4 below.
2existence of PSI-generated information may encourage imports by reducing importers￿costs (in
terms of bribes and delays). A primary tactic used by corrupt customs o¢ cials to extract bribes
from importers is to delay the clearance of shipments from customs, often on the pretext that
there is some discrepancy between the importer￿ s customs declaration and the shipment￿ s actual
contents. A preshipment inspection generates independent information on the contents of a
shipment that could increase an honest importer￿ s bargaining power vis-a-vis a corrupt customs
o¢ cer, potentially reducing customs clearance times.8
However, the success of preshipment inspection programs is far from guaranteed. Success re-
quires client governments to actually use the PSI-generated information to seek out and prosecute
corrupt actors. Governments may simply be hiring PSI ￿rms under pressure from multilateral
funding institutions, and may not actually use the data generated. Higher-level enforcers who
receive the PSI reports may not have the expertise to use the information e⁄ectively, or may
themselves be corrupt. It is also possible that customs corruption may be cost-reducing for im-
porters, if importers￿bribe-inclusive payments to customs are lower than legally-required duties
on shipments. So PSI may raise importers￿costs, reduce import volumes, and ultimately reduce
duty collections. Furthermore, importers whose costs are raised by PSI may seek out alternative
methods of avoiding import duties. In a detailed analysis of a preshipment inspection program
in the Philippines between 1989 and 1992, Yang (2004) ￿nds that expansion of import monitor-
ing caused substantial displacement of imports to unmonitored import categories, so that the
hypothesis of zero change in import duty avoidance cannot be rejected.
It is therefore an open question whether, on average across many countries, PSI programs
help raise import duty collections. The empirical analysis uses panel data on country-level out-
comes to examine the relationship between the implementation of PSI programs and import duty
collections for the years 1980 to 2000. In ￿nd that PSI programs are associated with increases
in the growth rate of import duties, of 6 to 8 percentage points annually. Additional evidence
suggests that reductions in corruption are behind the import duty improvements: PSI programs
are accompanied by increases in imports (potentially due to reductions in importers￿bribe pay-
ments) and declines in measures of mis-reporting in customs. Preshipment inspection appears
to be cost-e⁄ective: cumulative improvements in import duty collections in the ￿fth year of the
program were roughly 5 times larger than accumulated costs.9
8Low (1995) and Jenkins (1992) cite survey evidence that PSI was accompanied by dramatic reductions in
customs clearance times in Indonesia.
9These ￿ndings are not inconsistent with the results in Yang (2004), as the current paper estimates PSI￿ s
average e⁄ect across many countries, of which the Philippines is only one. It appears that in the Philippines
3The crucial empirical question is whether the association between PSI programs and higher
growth in import duties re￿ ects the causal impact of PSI. For instance, if countries implement
PSI programs at the same time as they make substantial public ￿nance reforms, it may be that
the observed increase in import duty growth is not due to PSI, but rather to other actions the
country takes coinciding with the introduction of PSI. I use several approaches to address such
concerns.
First, one might be concerned that PSI-using countries simply have di⁄erent long-term trends
in import duties (either experiencing faster or slower growth over time) than non-PSI countries,
and that these may bias the estimated e⁄ect of PSI. I address this concern by including country-
speci￿c time trends in the main regressions, which helps account￿ country by country￿ for slow-
moving changes in import duties over the entire time period. As it turns out, controlling for
country-speci￿c time trends leads to larger estimated e⁄ects of PSI on duty collections, re￿ ecting
the fact that time trends in import duties for PSI-implementing countries are more negative than
for other countries.
Second, one might be worried that PSI coincides with other policy or macroeconomic changes
that also a⁄ect import duty collections. For example, overall tax revenues (including import
duties) could rise due to concurrent general reforms of public ￿nances or an increase in economic
activity, and not because of the causal e⁄ect of PSI. As evidence against this concern, I document
that there is no appreciable change in other tax revenues (exclusive of import duties) when PSI
is introduced.10 In addition, the regression results are highly robust to controlling for the current
level of other tax revenues (which may be considered a proxy for other policy and macroeconomic
changes a⁄ecting tax collections).
Finally, it might be that concurrent reforms speci￿c to the customs agency (other than PSI)
are the true causal factor behind the change import duties. While it is di¢ cult to obtain data
on organizational reforms within customs across countries and over time, data does exist on
an important determinant of customs duty collections: tari⁄ rates. I ￿nd no indication that the
average tari⁄rate changes alongside PSI introduction, and the estimated impact of PSI on import
duties is essentially unchanged when controlling ￿ exibly for the current average tari⁄ rate.
between 1989 and 1992, importers did ￿nd that PSI raised their costs, and sought out alternative duty-avoidance
methods. Switching to alternative methods was possible because the Philippine PSI program was only a partial PSI
program during those years: only a de￿ned subset of import categories amounting to less than 50% of imports were
subject to the inspections. By contrast, most PSI programs provide much less opportunity for displacement, as
they typically cover upwards of 80-90% of imports (Rege 2001). The Philippine program was eventually expanded
(in March 1992) to cover essentially all imports, reducing substantially the opportunities for displacement.
10Figure 4 shows graphically that import duties show a marked increase in growth after PSI implemention, in
contrast to other tax revenues. The construction of the ￿gure will be explained in Section 4.
4This paper is part of a nascent empirical literature on the impact of monitoring on bureau-
cratic corruption worldwide. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) examine the impact of increased
enforcement on corruption in hospital procurement in Argentina. Olken (2004) provides ￿eld
experimental evidence on how di⁄erent types of monitoring a⁄ect corruption in Indonesian road
projects. In Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) ￿nd that capture of government funds in-
tended for education is reduced when intended funding levels are publicized in newspapers. In a
U.S. private-sector context, Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) use a ￿eld experiment to
document the impact of increased monitoring on opportunistic behavior by telephone call center
employees.
This paper also relates to research on avoidance of taxes on international trade. Existing
work documents the existence of import duty avoidance, but does not examine the impact of
enforcement on these activities (with the exception of Yang (2004)).11 Pritchett and Sethi (1994)
￿nd that collected import duties as a share of import value rise less than one-for-one with the
tari⁄ rate, and interpret this as evidence of tax evasion or avoidance. Fisman and Wei (2004)
￿nd that the extent of import underinvoicing rises in the tari⁄ rate among Chinese imports from
Hong Kong. A number of authors examine tax-induced transfer pricing within multinational ￿rms
(Bernard and Weiner (1990), Hines and Rice (1994) and Clausing (1998), among others). In the
related realm of income tax evasion, Klepper and Nagin (1989) examine cross-sectional correlates
of income underreporting on speci￿c line items of US tax returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on pre-
shipment inspection programs worldwide. Section 3 discusses the theoretical impact of an im-
provement in enforcers￿monitoring ability (such as preshipment inspection) on import duties, and
the potential channels through which preshipment inspection programs might a⁄ect import duty
collection. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the impact of preshipment inspection on
import duty collection and on the channels that appear to be mediate PSI￿ s e⁄ects, and conducts
several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background on preshipment inspection
A handful of multinational inspection ￿rms￿ all headquartered in Europe￿ provide preshipment
inspection services. The four dominant ￿rms are Bureau Veritas (based in Paris), Cotecna
(Geneva), Inchcape Testing Services (London), and Societe Generale de Surveillance (Geneva).
11Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) appeal for research on the responses of tax evaders to greater enforcement.
5Implementing a PSI program involves hiring one or more of these ￿rms to inspect incoming ship-
ments, using their established worldwide network of inspection agents. PSI programs are typically
initiated and supervised by a country￿ s ￿nance ministry (or occasionally its central bank), often
upon the recommendation of multilateral funding institutions. When governments institute PSI
programs, importers are required to have their incoming shipments inspected by a certi￿ed ￿rm￿ s
agents before they leave the country of origin. Importers inform the PSI ￿rm￿ s local o¢ ce of the
pending shipment, and the PSI ￿rm arranges for its own or a¢ liated agents in the origin country
to inspect the shipment before departure.
Shipments are typically inspected at the premises of the exporting ￿rm or at the port of depar-
ture. PSI ￿rms assess the tari⁄ classi￿cation, quantity, and total value of individual shipments,
and send their assessments to the client government. Many programs require that tamper-resistant
seals be placed on shipping containers after inspection. In nearly all PSI programs, the PSI ￿rm
does not collect the import duties; rather, actual duty collection remains the responsibility of
customs o¢ cials in the shipment￿ s destination country. Upon the shipment￿ s arrival in the des-
tination country, the client government can use the PSI ￿rm￿ s assessment to identify customs
o¢ cials who may be complicit in allowing misreporting of shipment contents and underpayment
of import duties. PSI contracts specify the speci￿c product categories and types of shipment that
are subject to the inspection requirement. Often, shipments below a minimum value threshold
(ranging from $500 to $5,000) are exempted from PSI. Data on the share of imports for which PSI
is required are not generally available, but when it has been reported the percentage is usually in
the 80%-90% range (see Rege 2001).
In return for their services, PSI ￿rms typically charge a fee of about 1% of the value of
imports inspected, usually with a minimum charge per shipment in the realm of $250. The
client government pays the fee in most PSI programs, but in some countries importers pay the
fee. Across all PSI-using countries between 1990 and 2000, estimated PSI fees amounted to an
average of 1.3% of central government tax revenues. Total fees paid worldwide to PSI ￿rms were
in the order of US$500 million annually during the same years.12
12For these fee calculations, I use data from the IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics and a historical database
of PSI programs I collected. The estimate of PSI fees paid in year t by country j is Feesjt = (0:01) ￿ (0:8) ￿
MjtPSIfracjt, where Mjt is the total value of shipments recorded as destined for country j in year t by trade
partner countries, and PSIfracjt is the fraction of year t that country j had an active PSI program. I assume
that PSI is only required for a fraction 0.8 of imports, and that the PSI fee is a fraction 0.01 of total imports
inspected. The annual worldwide total of Feesjt averages $547 million per year from 1990-2000.
63 A simple model of customs corruption
By making additional information available on the contents of incoming shipments, a preshipment
inspection program reduces the cost of monitoring corruption in customs. How should preship-
ment inspection a⁄ect the extent of import duty avoidance, import volumes, and import duties
collected? In this section I outline the theoretical impact of a reduction in the cost of enforce-
ment in customs. Such a cost reduction makes it optimal for the government to raise the level
of enforcement, and ultimately raises import duty collection overall. However, it is theoretically
ambiguous whether the increase in import duties arises because import duty avoidance has fallen,
import volumes have risen, or both.
We can think of corruption and enforcement in this context as a noncooperative game between
an honest "government" and corrupt "customs". On the one hand, the government￿ in practice,
perhaps the Minister of Finance or the head of state￿ seeks to maximize total government tax
revenue. On the other hand, customs￿ the agency responsible for collecting taxes on imports￿
and may extract bribes from importers in the course of collecting import duties. The government
chooses a level of enforcement against customs corruption that determines the expected cost to
customs of corrupt activities. In turn, customs sets the bribes it collects from importers and the
import duties turned over to the government.
3.1 The government
The government seeks to collect import duties on imported goods at a tari⁄ rate ￿ per dollar
of imports (valued at the world price inclusive of transport costs). Let this tari⁄ rate be set
exogenously (for example by political economy considerations that re￿ ect the political power of
domestic import-competing industries).
The government￿ s single choice variable is the "enforcement level", x. Higher enforcement
raises the punishment that customs expects to su⁄er for corrupt activities; we can think of higher
enforcement raising the amount of corruption that enforcers uncover in the customs agency.
Enforcement is costly, and is a⁄ected by an "enforcement cost" parameter ￿. Let the cost of
enforcement be denoted C (￿;x). The enforcement cost rises in both x and ￿ (@C
@x > 0; @C
@￿ > 0).
In addition, the marginal cost of enforcement rises in the enforcement cost parameter ( @2C
@x@￿ > 0).
The chosen enforcement level a⁄ects customs￿expected punishment (as described in the next
subsection).
Government￿ s objective function is net customs revenue, N, the di⁄erence between total im-
7port duty collections R and the cost of enforcement C, N = R ￿ C (￿;x).
3.2 Customs
Customs makes two decisions. First, it decides on the "bribe rate" b that importers must pay
per dollar of imports. Second, it decides on the rate at which to turn over import duties to
the government, the "payment rate" r. The bribe rate (b), and payment rate (r) are fractions
of the value of imports valued at the world price. In other words, customs charges importers a
certain bribe to allow imports into the country, separately decides how much to turn over to the
government as import duty revenue, and keeps the di⁄erence. (So for customs to make positive
pro￿ts, it is necessary that b > r.)
It is reasonable to expect that the payment rate r will be somewhat lower than the govern-
ment￿ s o¢ cial tari⁄rate ￿ (r < ￿), with the discrepancy between r and ￿ being in￿ uenced by the
extent of enforcement.
As for the bribe rate b, there is no strong a priori reason to expect it to be either lower or
higher than the tari⁄ rate. If the bribe rate is lower than the tari⁄ rate (b < ￿), importers face
lower import costs with corruption than if they had to pay the o¢ cial tari⁄ rate. If the bribe
rate exceeds the tari⁄ rate (b > ￿), then customs corruption raises importers￿costs.
Customs su⁄ers "punishment" J for its corrupt activities. J is a function of the enforcement
level x, the bribe rate b, the payment rate r, tari⁄s ￿, and imports M:
J ￿ J (x;b;r;￿;M):
The expected cost of punishment J includes ￿nes and imprisonment, lost salaries, public
shame, etc. for customs o¢ cers found to be corrupt. How might customs￿expected punishment
depend on x;b;r;￿, and M? The enforcement level a⁄ects the likelihood that any given corrupt
transaction will be discovered by the government, and so @J
@x > 0. The higher the bribe customs
demands from importers, the more likely some importer is to report the corrupt activity to the
government, and so @J
@b > 0. On the other hand, higher payments from customs to government
make punishment less likely, so @J
@r < 0. The higher the level of imports, the more likely the
government will discover evidence of corruption, and so @J
@M > 0. The tari⁄ rate should also
enter into the punishment function; in particular, the gap between the tari⁄ rate ￿ and customs￿
payment rate to government (￿￿r) should raise punishment: @J
@(￿￿r) > 0. Cross-partial derivatives
of punishment with respect to b and r, on the one hand, and x, on the other, are also likely to
8be important. For example, the marginal impact of the bribe rate and the payment rate on
punishment (in absolute value) should rise in the enforcement rate ( @2J
@b@x > 0 and @2J
@r@x < 0).
De￿ne customs pro￿ts, ￿, as gross bribes collected, minus import duties turned over to the
government, minus the expected cost of punishment:
￿ = bM ￿ rM ￿ J (x;b;r;￿;M)
Customs seeks to maximize customs pro￿ts. In other words, while customs may be a bureau-
cracy with many individual customs o¢ cers, I assume that it is able to solve the collective action
problem and maximize customs pro￿ts. This corrupt pro￿t is then divided in some fashion among
individual bureaucrats.13 Customs chooses the optimal combination of bribe rate and payment
rate (call them e b and e r) that maximizes customs pro￿ts ￿, given the enforcement rate x set by
the government.
3.3 Importers and domestic import demand
Bribes paid by importers a⁄ect the domestic market price of imports and total domestic demand
for the imported good. Assume there is a large number of importers. Normalize the world price
of the imported good (inclusive of transport costs) to 1. Let importers be in perfect competition.
The zero pro￿t condition implies that the domestic market price p of the imported good is driven
down to the world price plus the bribe rate paid to customs: p = 1 + b. The imported good
is normal, so aggregate demand for the imported good M is decreasing in the domestic market
price: M ￿ M (p) = M (1 + b), where @M
@p < 0 and so @M
@b < 0.
3.4 Government￿ s choice of enforcement rate (x)
Government simply chooses the enforcement level x to maximize N = R￿C (￿;x) = rM￿C (￿;x),
taking into account that the payment rate r and bribe rate b that customs will choose, and the







At the optimal enforcement level x￿, the marginal tax revenue collected as a result of a unit
increase in enforcement must equal the marginal cost to the government of imposing that unit of
13Corruption in customs is thus "centralized" rather than "decentralized", as in Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
9enforcement.
It is reasonable that gross revenues (R) would be a concave function of the enforcement level,
as in the darker line in Figure 1. At low enforcement levels, the marginal impact of enforcement
on gross revenues is very high, but the marginal e⁄ect on enforcement falls as enforcement rises.
This means that marginal revenue is a declining function of the enforcement level (the darker line
in Figure 2). Total costs of enforcement C should also be rising in the enforcement level, and
in Figure 1 they are assumed to be linear in x (the thinner line in Figure 1). As a result, the
marginal cost of enforcement is constant (the thinner line in Figure 2).
The intersection of the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve in Figure 2 gives the
government￿ s chosen enforcement rate x￿. In general, of course, the marginal cost of enforcement
may be increasing or decreasing, and the chosen enforcement rate will still be found at the
intersection of the two curves.
3.5 Impact of decreased enforcement cost
3.5.1 On total import duty collections
What is the impact of a decline in the enforcement cost parameter, ￿, on the government￿ s chosen
level of enforcement, x￿? In the case depicted in Figure 2, an decline in the enforcement cost
parameter ￿ leads the marginal cost function to shift downwards, so that the intersection with
the marginal revenue curve occurs at a higher enforcement level. And as can be seen from Figure
1, an increase in enforcement increases total import duty collections.
So far I have implicitly assumed a rational government with full information. More generally,
of course, it is possible that a government might choose excessively high enforcement. If the
total revenue function (the dark line in Figure 1) eventually turns downward so that it takes an
inverted-U shape, higher enforcement might actually lead to lower import duty collections overall.
So the ￿rst question this paper asks is whether increases in enforcement (implementation of PSI
programs) do in fact lead to higher import duty collections on average.
3.5.2 On the bribe rate and payment rate
Rewrite total import duties collected as the product of customs￿optimally-chosen payment rate





. When a reduction in enforcement costs leads to higher enforcement and thus higher
import duty collections R, it remains ambiguous how the increase in collections is achieved. Are
10higher collections achieved via a decrease in the bribes paid by importers e b (and thus an increase
in imports M), via an increase in the payment rate by customs to government e r, or both? In
fact, the increase in import duties can come about via either or both of these channels. The total






M (1 + b) + r




An increase in the bribe rate causes imports to decline (
@M(1+b)
@b < 0). So this decomposition re-
veals that there are several ways in which total revenues can rise with the increase in enforcement:
1. The payment rate rises, while the bribe rate declines (and so imports rise): @r




2. The payment rate is unchanged or falls, while the bribe rate declines (and imports rise):
@r
@x ￿ 0; @b
@x < 0; @M
@x > 0
3. The payment rate rises, while the bribe rate is unchanged or rises (and imports either are
unchanged or decline): @r
@x > 0; @b
@x ￿ 0; @M
@x ￿ 0
The empirical analysis to follow will examine whether the positive impact of enforcement on
import duty collections is due to higher payment rates, higher imports, or both.
3.6 A speci￿c example
The curves for import duty collections and enforcement costs (R and C) in Figure 1 and for mar-
ginal revenue and marginal cost (@R
@x and @C
@x) in Figure 2 derive from a speci￿c parameterization
of the model just described. Speci￿cally, import demand is assumed to be simply a declining
linear function of the bribe rate: M = ￿ ￿ ￿b.
The punishment function J is assumed to be: J = x(b ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ r)M. Punishment increases
in the enforcement level x, the amount of imports M, and in the gap between the bribe rate
paid by importers and the o¢ cial tari⁄rate, b￿￿. This latter relationship may arise if importers
become more likely to report bribery by customs o¢ cials the greater the gap between the payments
required by customs and the o¢ cial tari⁄ rate. In addition, punishment falls in the size of the
gap between the o¢ cial tari⁄ rate and customs￿payment rate to government (￿ ￿r). Finally, all
these terms interact with each other. For example, the cost of any given level of bribery rises in
11the enforcement rate, x, and in the amount of imports, M (malfeasance is likely to be easier to
discover if it is taking place on a larger volume of transactions).
Customs￿ pro￿t function (substituting in import demand) is thus ￿ = (b ￿ r)(￿ ￿ ￿b) ￿
x(b ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ r)(￿ ￿ ￿b), and customs￿optimal choices are:
e b = ￿ +
1
x
; e r =
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿x2 + ￿x ￿ 2￿
(￿ + (￿￿ ￿ ￿)x)x
The government, in turn, chooses enforcement level x. Total import duty collections is the
payment rate multiplied by imports (e r
￿
￿ ￿ ￿e b
￿
). Let the enforcement cost simply be linear in
the enforcement level (C = ￿x), so that net customs revenue is N = e r
￿
￿ ￿ ￿e b
￿
￿ ￿x. The


















The government chooses the enforcement rate that equates marginal revenue (left-hand side)
with the marginal cost of enforcement (right-hand side). The solution can be seen graphically in
Figure 2, at the intersection of the marginal revenue function and the marginal cost function (the
darker and lighter lines, respectively).14
In this example, the optimally-chosen bribe rate e b decreases and the payment rate e r increases
in the enforcement level (Figure 3). This is sensible, since the punishment function assumed
that punishment rises in the di⁄erence between the bribe rate and the tari⁄ rate (b ￿ ￿) and the
di⁄erence between the tari⁄ rate and the payment rate (￿ ￿ r).15
4 Empirical evidence on the impact of preshipment in-
spection
This section documents the impact of preshipment inspection programs on import duties col-
lected by national governments. I ￿rst describe the data sources used in the empirical analysis,
and discuss systematic di⁄erences between countries that did and did not implement preship-
ment inspection programs in the 1985-2000 period. I then present the main empirical results on
14The assumed values of the parameters are: ￿ = 0:2, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 0:01.
15More generally, of course, the impact of the enforcement level on the bribe and payment rates will vary
according to the assumed form of the punishment function J. Other punishment functions can yield bribe rates b
that are increasing or constant functions of x, and payment rates r that are decreasing or constant in x.
12the relationship between PSI programs an import duties, and provide evidence on the channels
(imports and mis-reporting) through which PSI￿ s e⁄ects operate. The remainder of the empirical
section addresses the relationship between the empirical results and the theoretical discussion of
section 3, conducts several robustness checks, and discusses the cost e⁄ectiveness of PSI.
4.1 Data sources and sample composition
The main outcome variable is the natural log of import duty collections, which is reported annually
in World Development Indicators 2004 (WDI 2004).16 There are several occasions when reported
import duty collections are very di⁄erent from other values of the same variable for the same
country, and are highly likely to be reporting errors. So I replace a reported observation of log
import duties with a missing value if it takes a value greater than 4 standard deviations away
from the mean of other reported import duties for the same country.17
The independent variables of interest, related to the existence and age of countries￿PSI pro-
grams, require data on the start and end dates of such programs. I assembled these program
dates via phone interviews and documentation provided by the four largest multinational ￿rms
that o⁄er PSI services, for all programs through the end of the year 2000.18
Other tax revenues (excluding import duties) and average tari⁄s are used as control variables
in the main regression analyses. Data on other tax revenues are from WDI 2004, and tari⁄ data
are compiled from various sources by the World Bank￿ s trade research group.19 The tari⁄ data
are simple average tari⁄s across all tari⁄lines. The tari⁄data contain a number of missing values;
when missing values occur in between years of available data, I ￿ll in missing values via linear
interpolation between the two non-missing years that bracket the missing data.
Bilateral trade data used in the construction of measures of mis-reporting in customs are
from the World Bank￿ s Trade and Production dataset. Some subsidiary regressions use data
on per capita GDP (from WDI 2004), a survey measure of bureaucratic corruption (from the
16Unless otherwise speci￿ed, all data in monetary units are in current US dollars.
17All told, this replacement a⁄ects just 10 observations that would otherwise have been included in the sample.
Of these 10, only two are for PSI countries observed before and after the start of a PSI program (and so would
a⁄ect the estimate of PSI￿ s e⁄ect): Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire) in 1998, reported to be
$1.18 million (reported import duties for other years range from $80 million to $396 million); and Belarus in
1992, reported to be $18 million (reported import duties for other years range from $123 million to $344 million).
Omitting these 10 outliers turns out to have little e⁄ect on the ultimate regression estimates, as will be shown in
the table of robustness checks to follow in subsection 4.4.
18These ￿rms are Bureau Veritas, Cotecna, Inchcape Testing Services (ITS), and Societe Generale de Surveillance
(SGS). The handful of remaining PSI ￿rms had contracts that entirely overlapped with those of the four largest
￿rms, so that these four ￿rms￿contracts provide a complete accounting of past programs.
19The tari⁄ data (including details on the sources used) are available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/tar2002.xls
13International Country Risk Guide, ICRG), and import data from an alternative source (IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics).
The ￿rst PSI contract started in 1985, so I limit the analyses to the years 1980 through 2000.
PSI is used exclusively in developing countries, so I restrict the sample to countries in Africa,
Asia, Europe, and Latin America/Caribbean that are not classi￿ed as ￿ high income￿by the World
Bank.20 I also drop countries from the analysis if they have complete data for less than three
years between 1980 and 2000.21
The largest resulting sample contains 1,372 observations from 104 countries. 19 of these
countries are observed in this sample before and after the start of their PSI programs (and so
directly contribute to the estimated e⁄ect of PSI on import duty collections). These countries and
their program dates are listed in Table 1. The remaining countries serve as controls, and primarily
contribute to the estimates by helping to pin down year e⁄ects and the coe¢ cients on various
control variables (such as other tax revenues and tari⁄ rates). The bottom rows of each results
table will indicate the number of countries included in the regression and the number of PSI-using
countries observed before and after the start of their PSI programs. The panel is unbalanced,
with the number of observations varying across countries depending on data availability.22
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the observations included in the sample. The unit of
observation is a country-year. "PSI" is an indicator variable for whether a given country had an
active PSI program for at least half of the given year; 9 percent of observations have an active
PSI program. The median observation had $228 million in import duties, and $1 billion in other
tax revenues. Import duties as a share of total tax revenues has a median of 0.19, and a mean
of 0.23. Median imports are $2.4 billion, median gross domestic product is $8.3 billion, and the
median simple average tari⁄ rate is 19 percent.
4.2 Which countries adopt PSI?
Prior to proceeding to the main empirical analysis, it is useful to shed light on the kinds of coun-
tries that eventually adopt PSI programs. Table 3 presents results from cross-country regressions
where the dependent variable is an indicator for a country implementing a PSI program sometime
20Constructing the sample this way eliminates Paci￿c island nations and dependencies, none of which have ever
used PSI, and which are not likely to have served as useful controls.
21Including such countries does not contribute to the analysis, as the outcomes for countries with only one or
two observations are entirely explained by the country ￿xed e⁄ect and the country-speci￿c linear time trend.
22The regression results are robust to conducting the estimation on more balanced panels (limiting the sample
to countries that are observed for most of the sample years), as will be discussed in subsection 4.4.
14between 1985 (the year of the world￿ s ￿rst PSI program) and 2000. The right-hand-side variables
are values in the ￿rst year of non-missing data between 1980 and 1984. (The countries in the
sample are a subset of those in the sample used in the main results of this paper, because not all
countries have complete data in the years 1980-1984.)
The ￿rst four columns of Table 3 are regressions of the indicator for PSI adoption on each
independent variable separately. Two coe¢ cient estimates are negative and highly statistically
signi￿cant: countries with lower per capita GDP and with more bureaucratic corruption are more
likely to use PSI. In column 5 all independent variables are included in the regression, and both
per capita GDP and bureaucratic corruption remain statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels.
In sum, countries that were poorer and that were judged to have higher bureaucratic corruption
in the early 1980s were more likely to adopt PSI programs between 1985 and 2001.
The pre-existing di⁄erences documented in Table 3 between PSI and non-PSI countries suggest
that it would be invalid to infer the impact of PSI by simply comparing PSI and non-PSI countries
at some point in time. Instead, it is crucial that the impact of PSI be inferred from changes
in import duty collections for PSI-using countries between pre- and post-PSI periods, in order
to account for time-invariant di⁄erences between countries that do and do not implement the
program.
4.3 The impact of PSI
I estimate here the relationship between the implementation of PSI programs and changes in total
import duties collected, total imports, and the extent of import mis-reporting in customs. The
main empirical approach is detrended di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences estimation. For outcome variable
Yjt (say, log import duties) for country j in year t, I estimate the following regression equation:
Yjt = ￿1PSIjt + ￿2 (PSIjt ￿ TREND)
+￿3PastPSIjt + ￿
0Xjt + ￿j (Dj ￿ TREND) + ￿j + ￿t + "jt (1)
PSIjt is an indicator variable for whether country j had an active PSI program for at least
half of year t. The ￿rst coe¢ cient of interest is ￿1, the level e⁄ect of having a PSI program on
the outcome variable. TREND is a linear time trend. The second coe¢ cient of interest is ￿2
on PSIjt ￿ TREND, which represents the program￿ s impact on the mean annual change in the
outcome variable (a growth e⁄ect).
15Country ￿xed e⁄ects ￿j control for time-invariant di⁄erences across countries. Year ￿xed
e⁄ects ￿t control for changes common to all countries in the same year. Country-speci￿c time
trends (￿j, the coe¢ cient on a country indicator Dj interacted with the time trend) help account
for the e⁄ect of slow-moving changes over time that occur throughout the sample period, and that
di⁄er across countries. Xjt is a vector of contemporaneous control variables (discussed below).
"jt is a mean-zero error term.
There are a few observations in the dataset for countries that used PSI in the past, but that
no longer do so. These observations should probably not be considered controls, since any impact
of PSI could persist beyond the end of a PSI program. So I estimate a separate ￿ Past-PSI￿e⁄ect
by including a variable in the regression analysis (PastPSIjt), which is an indicator for a country
is not using PSI for at least half a year, in a year after the end of a previous PSI program. With
the inclusion of the PastPSIjt variable, the regression estimates of the impact of PSI in e⁄ect
only derive from changes in outcomes associated with the adoption (not the elimination) of PSI
programs.
Serial correlation in the outcome and PSI variables are likely to be problems in this panel
dataset, biasing OLS standard error estimates downward (Bertrand, Du￿ o and Mullainathan
(2004)), so standard errors allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within countries
(standard errors are clustered by country).
The primary identi￿cation worry is that, simultaneous with PSI, changes in policy or broad
economic conditions may occur that also a⁄ect import duty collection. In particular, it is useful
to distinguish between two broad types of concurrent changes.
First, there are concurrent changes that a⁄ect overall tax collections. For example, the imple-
mentation of PSI could coincide with the installation of a more honest, technocratic government
(or, more narrowly, a more e⁄ective minister of ￿nance) that is better at collecting taxes overall.
Or PSI could coincide with periods of higher economic growth, which raises tax collections sim-
ply via increases in taxable economic activity. If PSI programs are indeed accompanied by more
technocratic government, or by higher economic growth, the estimated impact of PSI on import
duty collections would be biased upward.
To account for this type of concurrent change, I include the natural log of other tax revenues
(total taxes minus import duties) in the vector of contemporaneous controls Xjt when estimating
the impact of PSI on import duties. Other tax revenues (which include revenue from consumption
taxes, income taxes, and social security taxes) should be a useful proxy for the general factors
a⁄ecting overall tax revenue collections (honesty/ability of high government o¢ cials, or economic
16growth) to the extent that these general factors have similar e⁄ects on import duties and on other
tax revenues.23
The second type of concurrent changes are those that a⁄ect import duties in particular. For
example, changes in tari⁄ rates, non-tari⁄ trade barriers, or organizational reforms in customs
could change simultaneously with PSI and be the true causes of any observed change in import
duties. By nature, it is substantially more di¢ cult to ￿nd measures of these types of changes.
However, information on tari⁄ rates are available for a subset of countries and years. I will
therefore test the sensitivity of the results to inclusion of a country￿ s simple average tari⁄ rate in
the vector of controls Xjt. To the extent that other types of changes in customs are correlated
with changes in tari⁄rates, inclusion of this control may also capture the impact of those changes.
4.3.1 Graphical analysis
Prior to discussing the empirical results, a graphical view of the relationship between import
duties and PSI programs is informative. In Figure 4(a), the solid line plots the conditional mean
of log import duties in a range of years before and after the start of a country￿ s PSI program.
The conditional mean is normalized to zero in year -1. (Year -1 is the year immediately prior to
the starting year of the program, year 0 is the starting year, etc.)
Formally, the conditional means are generated by running the following regression on the
1,372-observation sample described in subsection 4.1, where the outcome variable is log import
duties:
Yjt = ￿￿20PSI_20jt + ￿￿19PSI_19jt
::: + ￿￿1PSI_1jt + ￿0PSI0jt + ￿1PSI1jt
::: + ￿13PSI13jt + ￿14PSI14jt
+￿PastPSIjt + ￿j (Dj ￿ TREND) + ￿j + ￿t + "jt (2)
The variables PSI_20jt, PSI_19jt, ..., PSI14jt are indicators for the observation occurring
a certain number of years before or after the start year of a country￿ s PSI program, for 20 years
before up to 14 years after (the complete set of before and after years observed in the data). These
indicators are all zero if the country never used PSI. The remaining variables were described in the
discussion of the the main regression equation 1 above (year ￿xed e⁄ects, country ￿xed e⁄ects,
23It is also of interest to consider other tax revenues as a comparison group for import duties, as I do in the
graphical analysis of the next subsection.
17country-speci￿c linear time trends, and an indicator for observation occurring in a year after
the end of a previous PSI program). The points comprising the solid line in Figure 4 are the
coe¢ cients ￿￿20 through ￿14 on these indicator variables, and the dotted lines depict the 95%
con￿dence intervals of each coe¢ cient estimate.
Figure 4(a) reveals that the conditional mean of log import duties for countries using PSI
shows a marked positive trend break immediately after the PSI start year. By contrast, there is no
obvious trend prior to the PSI start year. This fact is helpful, as it provides evidence that the later
increase in import duties is unlikely to be driven by mean reversion. Each coe¢ cient on indicators
for years after PSI start is statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 95% con￿dence level,
while none of the coe¢ cients for years prior to PSI start are statistically signi￿cant.
To gain con￿dence that this trend break in import duties is not being driven by unobserved
changes occurring in countries concurrently with PSI programs, it is useful to conduct the same
graphical analysis for an outcome that should be una⁄ected by preshipment inspection, but
that is likely to respond to similar third factors in￿ uencing tax collections overall (a change in
government, or economic growth). As mentioned above, other tax revenues (total taxes minus
import duties) is such an outcome. The more similar is the graph for other tax revenues to the
graph for import duties, the more concerned one might be that unobserved changes aside from
PSI are explaining the post-PSI growth in import duties.
So Figure 4(b) presents regression coe¢ cients and standard errors from a regression identical
to equation 2 above but where the outcome variable is the log of other tax revenues. (For
comparison, the vertical axes are identical in Figures 4(a) and 4(b).) While there appears to be a
slight increase in log other tax revenues after the implementation of PSI, the increase is markedly
smaller in magnitude than the corresponding increase in log import duties. What￿ s more, none
of the coe¢ cients for the post-PSI years are statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. To
the extent that other tax revenues are a reasonable proxy for unobserved changes a⁄ecting tax
revenues overall, Figure 4(b) provides little reason to be concerned that such unobserved changes
are driving the post-PSI changes in import duties.24
24Note that in both graphs in Figure 4, the coe¢ cients for the higher number of years before and after the PSI
start year are relatively imprecisely estimated, due to small numbers of countries observed at these dates. There
are less than 10 countries observed at years 7 and after and years -16 and prior to the start of PSI programs. The
number of countries observed at each year closer to the start year ranges from 10 to 26.
184.3.2 Main regression results: impact of PSI on import duties
The graphical analysis indicates that PSI led to a positive trend break in log import duties.
This subsection shows that this conclusion holds in a more parsimonious speci￿cation, where the
impact of PSI on import duties is not allowed to vary completely ￿ exibly for every year before
and after PSI start. I estimate equation 1, where the e⁄ect depicted in Figure 4(a) is summarized
in an intercept shifter, ￿1, and a trend shifter ￿2.
Table 4 presents regression results for versions of equation 1 that are more or less inclusive of
the equation￿ s right-hand-side variables. All equations in the table include the PSIjt indicator,
the PSIjt ￿ TREND interaction term, and the PastPSIjt indicator. Columns 1 to 3 present
results for the largest (1,372-observation) sample. In the ￿rst column, the regression includes no
other right-hand-side variables; the coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND is positive and statistically
signi￿cant at the 10% level. When country-speci￿c time trends are included in the regression
(column 2), the coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND more than doubles in magnitude and is highly
statistically signi￿cant. This appears to re￿ ect the fact that PSI-using countries have more
negative ongoing trends in import duties on average than do non-PSI countries. In column 3, the
log of other tax revenues is included in the regression. The coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND falls
slightly in magnitude (from 0.076 to 0.063), but it remains statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level,
providing no indication that changes concurrent with PSI in countries￿overall tax collection are
a substantial cause for concern.
To gauge whether changes in customs itself concurrent with PSI are a likely source of omitted
variable bias, it is important to also control for the simple average tari⁄ across tari⁄ lines. So
columns 4 to 7 limit the observations to those with complete tari⁄ information. Columns 4
to 6 are identical speci￿cations to columns 1 to 3, respectively, to con￿rm that the change in
sample composition does not materially a⁄ect the estimates. The results are very similar: the
coe¢ cient on PSIjt￿TREND becomes larger in magnitude when controlling for country-speci￿c
time trends, and is not greatly a⁄ected when the control for ln(other tax revenues) is included.
In general, the coe¢ cients in columns 4-6 are slightly larger in than corresponding coe¢ cients in
columns 1-3, and achieve slightly higher levels of statistical signi￿cance.
In column 7, a linear control for the tari⁄rate is included in the regression, and the coe¢ cient
on PSIjt ￿ TREND is essentially unchanged in its magnitude and statistical signi￿cance level.
There is no indication that the estimate of PSI￿ s e⁄ect is confounded by concurrent changes in
the average tari⁄rate within countries (or by other factors speci￿c to import duty collection that
19tend to change in the same direction as tari⁄s).
Across all the columns in Table 4, the coe¢ cient on PSIjt (the intercept shifter) is less
stable. When country-speci￿c time trends are not included in the regression (columns 1 and 4),
the coe¢ cient is negative. The coe¢ cient becomes positive when country-speci￿c time trends
are included, and remains so when controls for other tax revenues and tari⁄s are added. But
the coe¢ cient is generally imprecisely estimated: it is only statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero in columns 3 and 6 (and in the latter case only at the 10% level). The coe¢ cient
on PastPSIjt is positive in all speci￿cations where country-speci￿c time trends are included,
providing a tentative indication that the e⁄ect of PSI persists beyond the end of PSI programs;
however, these coe¢ cients are very imprecisely estimated and so not a great deal can be said with
con￿dence on this front.
The reason why the coe¢ cient estimates of PSI￿ s e⁄ect do not change substantially when
controls are added to the regression for other tax revenues and the tari⁄ rate is that neither of
these variables change materially with the introduction of PSI. Table 5 presents regression results
from estimation of equation 1 where the outcome variable is ln(other tax revenues) in columns 1
and 2, and the simple average tari⁄ rate in columns 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 3 present results
without country-speci￿c time trends, and columns 2 and 4 include these trend variables. The
coe¢ cients on PSIjt￿TREND are all small in magnitude and none are statistically signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. The coe¢ cients on the PSIjt main e⁄ect in regressions with country-speci￿c
time trends are also small and statistically insigni￿cant.
4.3.3 Channels of PSI￿ s e⁄ect on import duties
If PSI is accompanied by improved growth in import duty collections, the question remains as
to how these improvements come about. The discussion in section 3 above makes clear that a
reduction in the government￿ s cost of enforcement (generated, for example, by a PSI program)
leads to greater enforcement and higher import duty collections. But this improvement in duty
collections can come about in a number of ways: it can occur because the fraction of true import
values turned over by customs to government, r, approaches (from below) the o¢ cial tari⁄ rate,
￿; because imports rise (if importers￿payment rate to customs b has fallen, lowering market prices
and raising import demand); or both. I document here that both of these channels appear to be
a⁄ected by PSI.
When customs turns over to the government a fraction of true import values that is lower
20than the o¢ cial tari⁄ rate, it must alter o¢ cial import records to hide evidence of such theft.
So evidence that mis-reporting of import data has declined can be taken as indirect evidence of
declines in customs corruption. I describe here measures that are likely to capture two types
of mis-reporting: 1) mis-reporting of import values ("undervaluation"), and 2) mis-reporting of
goods classi￿cations.
Import duties are typically assessed as a fraction of declared shipment values, so a main method
of duty avoidance is to simply declare on a customs declaration that an imported shipment has
a value lower than its true value ("undervaluation"). A natural measure of undervaluation is
the fraction of the value of imports sent to a country (as reported by trade partners) that are
actually recorded in a country￿ s import statistics. Speci￿cally, I construct what I call the ￿ import
capture ratio￿ : a country￿ s total reported imports in a given year, divided by the total reported
exports of trade-partner countries to the same country.25 All other things equal, countries with
less undervaluation in customs should have higher import capture ratios.
Essentially, the export reports of trade partner countries become the benchmark against which
the corresponding import data are to be compared. But due to transport costs and export misre-
porting, cross-sectional di⁄erences between countries￿import capture ratios cannot be completely
ascribed to di⁄erences in undervaluation.26 That said, ￿xed e⁄ects and country-speci￿c time
trends included in the estimation will account for level and trend di⁄erences in the import cap-
ture ratio across countries. So transport costs and misreporting of partner country exports will
not be problematic if trend breaks in these factors are not correlated with the imposition of PSI
in destination countries. Using a measure such as the import capture ratio also presumes that
undervaluation does not also occur in the customs declarations in the country of export. This
assumption is most plausible if customs o¢ cers (not importers) are primarily the ones falsifying
import data in customs, as the destination country￿ s customs o¢ cers should have no ability to
alter export data in the shipment￿ s origin country. Even if importers play a role in making false
statements on customs declarations, they have no direct reason to falsify their declarations to
the exporting country, as there is essentially no sharing of export and import statistics between
origin and destination countries for the purposes of customs enforcement.
25Most recently, Fisman and Wei (2004) use a similar measure at the disaggregated product level to demonstrate
the relationship between tari⁄s and underinvoicing in China-Hong Kong trade, but the basic strategy of inferring
smuggling from discrepancies between a country￿ s import data and its trade partners￿export data has a long
history. See, for example, Morgenstern (1950), Bhagwati (1964), Naya and Morgan (1969), and De Wulf (1981).
26Import data reported by destination countries typically include the cost of freight and insurance (they are
c.i.f., or ￿ cost, insurance, and freight￿ ), while export data collected by origin countries do not (they are f.o.b., or
￿ free on board￿ ).
21To construct import capture ratios, I use the World Bank￿ s Trade and Production dataset.27
The sample mean of the import capture ratio is 0.86, with a standard error of 0.33.
Undervaluation is not the only method of concealing the avoidance or theft of import duties,
however. Another generic strategy is to mis-report the goods classi￿cation of a shipment, to
make it appear that the shipment is in a category subject to lower tari⁄s and thus lower import
duty payments. What might be a plausible quantitative measure of the extent of mis-reporting
of goods classi￿cations? Consider a simple case where a country imports only two goods (1 and
2) that are initially subject to the same import tari⁄ rate. Because the tari⁄ rate is the same
across goods, there is no incentive to mis-report goods classi￿cation. Let the import capture ratio
in this initial period 0 (denoted ￿
t






Now let the tari⁄structure change in the subsequent period (period 1) so that Good 1 is subject
to a higher import tari⁄, while Good 2￿ s tari⁄ rate stays the same. Now, there is incentive to
mis-report shipments of Good 1 as Good 2, thereby avoiding import duties. At the same time,
there is no incentive to mis-report shipments of Good 2. If this pattern of misreporting occurs,
the amount of imports of Good 1 in the country￿ s import statistics will be understated, while










The thing to note is that mis-reporting increases the dispersion of import capture ratios across
goods, vis-a-vis the initial situation where there was no mis-reporting. In this simple example, in
period 0 there was zero dispersion as import capture ratios were identical across the two goods.
After mis-reporting (in period 1), dispersion in import capture ratios appears, as the ratio for
Good 1 has fallen, while that of Good 2 has risen. All other things held equal, then, increases in
mis-reporting of goods classi￿cations should lead to increased dispersion of import capture ratios
across goods within a country, while declines in mis-reporting of goods classi￿cations should lead
to decreased dispersion.
So a natural measure of the mis-reporting of goods classi￿cations is the coe¢ cient of variation
of import capture ratios across goods within a country. I use bilateral import and corresponding
export data for 82 ISIC 4-digit goods classi￿cations in the World Bank Trade and Production
27The crucial feature of this dataset is its inclusion of a country￿ s import data as well as the corresponding
export data from partner countries. (In addition, the trade data is also disaggregated by product, which will be
useful for the next measure of mis-reporting, discussed below.) The number of observations in the sample falls due
to the more limited inclusion of countries in this dataset. The resulting sample includes 581 observations from 39
countries, 9 of which are observed before and after the start of their PSI programs.
22dataset to construct this measure.28 The mean of this measure in the sample is 0.98, with a
standard deviation of 0.84.
In addition to these two measures of import mis-reporting, I also examine the impact of PSI
on the total volume of imports, to identify any trade-facilitating e⁄ect of the program which may
re￿ ect declines in importers￿costs (due to declining bribe payments). To separate PSI￿ s trade-
facilitating e⁄ect from its e⁄ect on mis-reporting, it is useful to use an import measure that is
less prone to undervaluation. So I use the total value of exports recorded by all other countries
as destined for the country in question as the import measure (which I call ￿ partner-reported
imports￿ ). The source for these data is also the World Bank Trade and Production dataset.29
To assess the impact of PSI on mis-reporting and on import volumes, I estimate equation
1 where the outcome variable is either a country￿ s overall import capture ratio, the coe¢ cient
of variation of the import capture ratio across product groups, and the log of partner-reported
imports. The results are presented in Table 6. All regressions include country and year ￿xed
e⁄ects, country-speci￿c time trends, and the log other tax revenues.
The sample size has changed from regressions in previous tables, so to con￿rm that the basic
results still hold, the ￿rst column presents coe¢ cient estimates on the PSI variables when the
outcome variable is log import duties. As before, the coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND is positive
and statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. In magnitude, it is slightly larger (at 0.104)
than in regressions in the previous tables. The coe¢ cient on the PSIjt indicator is positive and
statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, and large in magnitude (0.237), indicating that PSI
also appears to have a sizable e⁄ect on the level of import duties (not just its growth rate) in this
subsample.
In column 2, the dependent variable is the import capture ratio. The coe¢ cient on the
PSIjt indicator is positive and statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level. Its
magnitude indicates that PSI programs are associated with a one-time improvement in import
capture ratios of 5.5 percentage points. However, PSI does not seem to be associated with a
change in the growth rate of import capture ratios: the coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND is small
28Import capture ratios are likely to contain substantial noise due simply to reporting errors in both the importing
and exporting country data that have nothing to do with intentional fraud or corruption. For example, errors in
the goods classi￿cation in the export data will lead to ￿ uctuation in the denominator of the import capture ratio.
For goods categories imported in large volumes, noise from this source may be averaged out, but noise from data
errors is likely to be quite large for small trade ￿ ows. So before taking the coe¢ cient of variation of product-level
import capture ratios, I exclude trade ￿ ows (at the product level within countries) amounting to less than $100,000
(partner-reported). This exclusion eliminates a very small amount of trade by value (substantially less than one
percent of total trade in the dataset).
29This dataset includes export data from 67 countries, so the "partner-reported imports" data will be from this
set of countries.
23in magnitude (and actually negatively signed) and is not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero.
In column 3, the dependent variable is the coe¢ cient of variation of log import capture ratios
across 82 product groups. The coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND is negative and highly statisti-
cally signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. As discussed above, reductions in mis-reporting of goods
classi￿cations should lead to decreased dispersion of import capture ratios (lower coe¢ cient of
variation) within a country-year cell. So this result suggests that PSI leads to an ongoing decline
in mis-reporting of goods classi￿cations. The coe¢ cient on the PSIjt indicator is negative and
large in magnitude (more than a third of a standard deviation of the dependent variable), but its
standard error is quite large so that it is only of marginal statistical signi￿cance (the p-value is
0.16). This may be taken as merely suggestive evidence that PSI￿ s impact on the dispersion of
product-level import capture ratios also has a one-time negative level e⁄ect.
In column 4, the dependent variable is the log of partner-reported imports. There is little
indication of an initial one-time boost to imports from PSI: the coe¢ cient on the PSIjt indicator is
small in magnitude (and is actually negative in sign), and is not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero. But PSI is accompanied by a positive trend break in log imports, as evidenced by the
positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on PSIjt￿TREND. The coe¢ cient indicates that
PSI programs are associated with an increase in the growth in imports of roughly 4 percentage
points annually.30
In sum, then, the improved growth in import duties is likely to be operating via both of
the channels identi￿ed in theory. First, PSI leads to reductions in the theft of import duties,
as evidenced by a favorable trend break in a measure of mis-reporting of goods classi￿cations
(the coe¢ cient of variation of product-level import capture ratios). This may be thought of as
an increase in r.31 Second, PSI is accompanied by a positive trend break in the log of imports,
providing a growing base from which import duties can be collected. This latter result is consistent
with PSI reducing the overall cost of imports, perhaps via reductions in the payments by importers
to customs (b in the theoretical model), raising consumer demand for imported goods.
30To maintain consistency in sample and data source across columns 2, 3, and 4, the regression for the log of
imports (column 4) uses partner-reported import data for the 39 sample countries included in the World Bank
Trade and Production dataset. More complete data on partner-reported imports are available from the IMF￿ s
Direction of Trade Statistics database. Results are very similar when the regression in column 4 is re-estimated
using partner-reported import data from this alternative source during the same years (raising the number of
observations to 1,316). The coe¢ cient on the PSI*Trend variable in this regression is 0.034, and has a standard
error of 0.018.
31PSI is also accompanied by a one-time improvement in the import capture ratio for total imports, which may
help explain one-time improvements in the level of import duty collections but cannot explain the trend break in
import duty growth.
24Why might PSI lead to continued improvements in outcome variables, rather than simply gen-
erating one-time gains? Client governments may need time to set up the information systems and
install the skilled and honest enforcers that are necessary for e⁄ective use of program-generated
information. Higher authorities also presumably learn over time the best ways to use the new
information to identify and prosecute corrupt customs o¢ cers. Learning could also take place on
the part of the private ￿rms, who may need time to acquire expertise in pricing a particular coun-
try￿ s basket of imports. The continued growth in outcomes may also represent gradual investment
by PSI ￿rms in setting up the network of inspection agents in areas from which a particular client
country imports. At the beginning of a particular contract, the PSI ￿rm￿ s existing network of
agents may not yet be distributed worldwide in a way that minimizes the delays due to inspection.
Over time, PSI ￿rms may modify the distribution of agents to more speedily inspect a particular
country￿ s shipments and better realize the trade-facilitating potential of PSI.
4.4 Robustness checks
It is important to test the robustness of the main empirical results to alternative sets of assump-
tions. Table 7 presents regression results from a range of additional speci￿cations of the main
regression equation 1. Each column is a di⁄erent speci￿cation. These results should be compared
with the regression results in Table 4. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 7 should be compared with column
3 of Table 4, the speci￿cation where independent variables include country-speci￿c time trends
and log other tax revenues.
The samples used in the regressions of Table 4 are unbalanced: the countries included in the
sample vary substantially in the number of observations, ranging from 3 to 21 observations over
the 1980-2000 period of analysis. One might be concerned that patterns of entry into and exit
from the sample may be driving the empirical results. So columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 present
regression results when the sample is restricted to countries that are observed for all or nearly all
years. In column 1, countries are included in the sample if they are observed for 15 or more years
during the period of analysis; in column 2, the threshold is 18 or more years. The results provide
no indication that the use of an unbalanced panel in the main regressions a⁄ects the fundamental
conclusions. The coe¢ cient on on PSIjt￿TREND is positive and highly statistically signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero in both subsamples. In magnitude, the coe¢ cients are actually slightly larger
than in column 3 of Table 4. The coe¢ cients on the PSIjt indicator are not greatly a⁄ected,
remaining positive and statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and of similar magnitudes.
25The main estimation sample includes a number of very small countries whose trends in import
duties may not serve as useful counterfactuals (in particular, small island nations such as St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, the Seychelles, and the Maldives). So the regression results in
column 3 of Table 7 are for a sample that excludes observations for countries with populations
under 1 million (on average from 1980-2000). Exclusion of small countries from the regression
has very little e⁄ect on the results: the coe¢ cients on the PSI variables are essentially identical
to those in column 3 of Table 4.
Column 4 of Table 7 presents regression results when a small number of outliers of log im-
port duties (previously excluded) are included in the regression. The inclusion of these outlier
observations reduces the coe¢ cient on PSIjt ￿ TREND only slightly (from 0.063 to 0.055), and
the coe¢ cient remains statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The coe¢ cient on PSIjt also
falls slightly (from 0.161 to 0.126) but it remains statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at
the 10% level.
Finally, one might be concerned that linear controls for log other tax revenues and the simple
average tari⁄ rate are not su¢ ciently ￿ exibly speci￿ed to properly account for other changes
concurrent with PSI that may also a⁄ect import duty collections. So in column 5 of Table 7, I
control for these two variables speci￿ed very ￿ exibly, as 10-piece linear splines. (These regression
results should be compared with those in column 7 of Table 4). Controlling more ￿ exibly for
these two variables has very little e⁄ect on the estimated coe¢ cients on PSIjt ￿ TREND and
PSIjt, providing no indication that one should be concerned about improper speci￿cation of log
other tax revenues and the tari⁄ rate.
4.5 Cost-e⁄ectiveness of PSI
Do PSI-generated improvements in import duties exceed program costs? PSI a⁄ects the rate of
change of import duties, in addition to its level, so that cost-bene￿t ratios will change over time.
Here I present rough estimates of the cost-e⁄ectiveness of PSI, focusing solely on the ratio of
improvements in import duty collections to the fees paid to PSI ￿rms for their services. As such,
this is not a welfare calculation: I am excluding, for example, any improvements in consumer
welfare due to lower goods prices, and the losses experienced by customs o¢ cials from declines
in their corrupt pro￿ts.
I assume the impact of PSI on the level and growth of log import duties is given by regres-
sion estimates for the most-inclusive estimation sample, column 3 of Table 4 (this is among the
26least favorable of the main regression estimates). I assume that 90% of a country￿ s imports are
inspected, that PSI fees are 1% of the value of inspected goods, and there are no ongoing trends
in import duties and imports. PSI also a⁄ects import growth, and so raises the cost of PSI by
raising the value of goods inspected. For the impact of PSI on the growth of log imports, I use
the estimate from column 4 of Table 6.32 Finally, I let import duties start at 15.25% of imports
prior to the introduction of PSI (the mean value in the 5 years prior to the PSI starting year
among the 19 countries observed before and after the PSI start date in column 3 of Table 4).
Normalizing the level of imports to 100 prior to the program, this means that import duties are
15.25 prior to PSI.
Table 8 presents a comparison of estimated cumulated costs and bene￿ts from the ￿rst year
(year 0) to the 10th of a typical PSI program. Column 1 of Panel A displays the progression of
import duties over time, column 2 is each year￿ s improvement from the pre-program level, and
column 3 calculates cumulative improvements in import duties thus far. In Panel B, column 5 is
the new level of imports in each year, column 6 is fees paid to PSI ￿rms in that year, and column
7 is accumulated fees paid thus far.
Column 4 of Panel A is the cumulative cost-bene￿t ratio: cumulative import duty improve-
ments (column 3) divided by cumulative fees paid (column 7). PSI appears to be a highly
cost-e⁄ective program. In the program￿ s starting year, the program has a cost-bene￿t ratio of
2.96. Import duties collected rise at a rate faster than fees paid, so the cost-bene￿t ratio rises
over time, reaching 5.27 in the ￿fth year of the program (year 4), and 8.83 in the eleventh year
(year 10).
5 Conclusion
When governments fear that increased monitoring of bureaucratic corruption will fail due to the
corruptibility of the monitors, it is often proposed to "hire integrity" from private ￿rms. In
contrast to existing empirical work on bureaucratic corruption, this paper is the ￿rst to examine
the e⁄ectiveness of information generated by private ￿rms in anti-corruption e⁄orts. In addition,
it provides evidence that increased monitoring by higher authorities can be e⁄ective in reducing
bureaucratic corruption.
I examine the impact of programs in a number of developing countries where governments
32I assume no level e⁄ect of PSI on log imports because the estimate of the level e⁄ect of PSI in that regression
is small and not statistically signi￿cant.
27hire private ￿rms to conduct preshipment inspections of imports (PSI), generating data that
higher authorities can use to combat corruption in customs agencies. Preshipment inspection
programs lead to large increases in the growth rate of import duties, by 6 to 8 percentage points
annually. This improvement does not appear to be due to concurrent macroeconomic or other
changes, because the growth rate of other tax revenues does not increase accordingly. Declines
in customs corruption are likely to be behind the improvements in import duties: the programs
also lead to increases in imports (potentially re￿ ecting lower bribe payments) and to declines
in mis-reporting of goods classi￿cations. Hired integrity in this case is quite cost-e⁄ective, with
cumulative improvements in import duty collections by the ￿fth year of a typical inspection
program coming to roughly 5 times accumulated costs.
While this paper sheds light indirectly on the channels through which PSI programs a⁄ect
import duty collections, any study using country-level data is necessarily limited in how much
it can reveal about microeconomic channels at work. Valuable future research could explore
the micro-level impact of preshipment inspection programs in particular countries. For example,
product-level data on the volume and prices of imported goods within a country could be used
to con￿rm that PSI raises import demand by reducing the domestic-market prices of inspected
goods. Surveys of importers could shed light on whether PSI reduces clearance times and bribes
paid. Disaggregated trade data could be used to further document changes in mis-reporting of
goods classi￿cations. In addition, even though PSI appears to be e⁄ective on average across
countries, micro-studies could identify the conditions under which expanding monitoring may not
be e⁄ective,33 and ways in which the programs can be modi￿ed to improve their e⁄ectiveness.
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31Table 1: Active dates for PSI programs
  (as of end of year 2000)




















NOTES-- Start and end dates for countries' PSI programs obtained by author 
directly from the four major PSI firms. Unspecified end date means contract was 
still active as of the end of year 2000. Three countries experienced interruptions in 
their PSI programs: Pakistan between 11/30/91 and 9/1/94; Rep. of Congo between 
5/31/98 and 3/4/99; Madagascar between 7/31/92 and 12/4/92. Only countries with 
data on import duties before and after contract start date are listed.Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Num. of obs.
PSI 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 1,372
Import duties 722 228 1,368 0.007 12,010 1,372
Ln (import duties) 5.34 5.43 1.83 -4.95 9.39 1,372
Other tax revenues 5,976 1,006 12,926 0.7 156,810 1,372
Ln (other tax revenues) 6.89 6.91 2.20 -0.39 11.96 1,372
Import duties as share of 
total tax revenues 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.80 1,372
Imports 7,772 2,353 16,268 0.0 162,659 1,369
Ln(imports) 7.53 7.76 1.97 0.00 12.00 1,369
Gross domestic product 44,613 8,300 97,890 42 946,301 1,372
Ln(gross domestic product) 22.87 22.84 2.00 17.56 27.58 1,372
Tariff rate 22.03 19.00 15.20 0.00 102.20 998
NOTES-- Unit of observation is a country-year, for 104 developing countries between 1980 and 2000. 
Developing countries are those not classified as "high income" by World Bank's country groupings. Sample 
excludes countries with less than three years of data on import duties between 1980 and 2000, and Pacific island 
nations and dependencies. "PSI" is an indicator that a PSI program is active for at least half of a given year 
(program dates collected by author directly from the four main PSI firms). Other tax revenues is total tax revenues 
minus import duties. Import duties, other tax revenues, and gross domestic product are in millions of current US$ 
(source: World Development Indicators 2004). "Tariff rate" is simple average tariff (in percentage points) across 
all tariff lines, with some years of missing data interpolated (source: World Bank).Table 3: Predicting PSI adoption
(OLS estimates)
Dependent variable: Indicator for country adopting PSI by end of year 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (per capita GDP) -0.207 -0.193
(0.044)*** (0.060)***
Ln (import duties) -0.001 -0.052
(0.029) (0.055)
Ln (imports) 0.000 0.037
(0.028) (0.066)
Bureaucratic corruption -0.834 -0.470
   (absence of) (0.273)*** (0.272)*
Constant 1.863 0.433 0.426 0.803 2.010
(0.309)*** (0.153)*** (0.209)** (0.130)*** (0.428)***
Num. of obs. 76 77 77 55 55
R-squared 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.32
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Mean of dependent variable is 0.48. Standard errors in parentheses. Right-hand-
side variables are values in the first year of non-missing data from 1980-1984. No PSI 
program was implemented prior to 1985. Per capita GDP is in constant 1995 dollars. Import 
duties and imports are in millions of current US dollars. "Bureaucratic corruption" normalized 
to range from 0 to 1, with 0 being "worst" and 1 being "best" (source: ICRG). Per capita GDP 
and import duties are from World Development Indicators 2004. Imports are from IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics, as reported by trade partner countries.Table 4: Impact of preshipment inspection on import duty collection
(OLS fixed effects estimates)
Dependent variable: Ln (import duties)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: All observations                 Observations with tariff data
PSI * Trend 0.036 0.076 0.063 0.041 0.088 0.083 0.086
(0.020)* (0.025)*** (0.026)** (0.019)** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)***
PSI -0.121 0.144 0.161 -0.053 0.145 0.131 0.126
(0.145) (0.096) (0.067)** (0.137) (0.099) (0.076)* (0.078)
Past PSI -0.327 0.203 0.188 -0.182 0.31 0.349 0.374
(0.211) (0.240) (0.184) (0.195) (0.308) (0.261) (0.273)
Ln(other tax revenues) 0.539 0.666 0.673
(0.062)*** (0.091)*** (0.093)***
Simple average tariff rate 0.006
(0.003)**
Country-specific time trends - Y Y - Y Y Y
Observations 1,372 1,372 1,372 998 998 998 998
R-squared 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97
Number of countries:
   Total 104 104 104 85 85 85 85
   Observed pre- and post- PSI 19 19 19 18 18 18 18
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors (corrected for clustering by country) in parentheses. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. "PSI" equal to 1 if 
country had an active PSI program for at least half of given year, 0 otherwise. "Past PSI" equal to 1 if PSI program is absent for at least half a year but 
country had previously had a PSI program, and 0 otherwise. "Trend" is a linear time trend starting in the first year a PSI program was active for at least half 
a year. "Other tax revenues" is total tax revenues minus import duties. See Table 2 for notes on sample composition and other variable definitions. One PSI 
country (Belarus) dropped out in columns 4-7 due to absence of sufficient tariff data.Table 5: Impact of preshipment inspection on other tax revenues and tariff rate
(OLS fixed effects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Ln (other tax 
revenues)







PSI * Trend -0.004 0.025 -0.224 -0.582
(0.026) (0.026) (0.333) (0.642)
PSI -0.262 -0.031 -2.514 0.845
(0.160) (0.124) (2.351) (2.543)
Past PSI -0.265 0.028 -10.094 -4.374
(0.196) (0.216) (5.666)* (5.397)
Other controls:
  Country-specific time trend - Y - Y
Observations 1,372 1,372 998 998
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.80 0.93
Number of countries:
   Total 104 104 85 85
   Observed pre- and post- PSI 19 19 18 18
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors (corrected for clustering by country) in parentheses. All regressions include country 
and year fixed effects. "Other tax revenues" is total tax revenues minus import duties. "PSI" equal to 1 if country 
had an active PSI program for at least half of given year, 0 otherwise. "Past PSI" equal to 1 if PSI program is 
absent for at least half a year but country had previously had a PSI program, and 0 otherwise. "Trend" is a linear 
time trend starting in the first year a PSI program was active for at least half a year. See Table 2 for notes on 
sample composition and other variable definitions.Table 6: Impact of preshipment inspection on determinants of import duty collection
(OLS fixed effects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)








PSI * Trend 0.104 -0.018 -0.114 0.040
(0.030)*** (0.014) (0.035)*** (0.018)**
PSI 0.237 0.055 -0.348 -0.015
(0.104)** (0.030)* (0.247) (0.055)
Past PSI 0.567 -0.111 -1.74 0.188
(0.221)** (0.106) (0.468)*** (0.140)
Ln(other tax revenues) 0.661 0.041 -0.051 0.423
(0.122)*** (0.028) (0.193) (0.069)***
Observations 581 581 581 581
R-squared 0.97 0.84 0.56 0.99
Number of countries:
   Total 39 39 39 39
   Observed pre- and post- PSI 9 9 9 9
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors (corrected for clustering by country) in parentheses. All regressions include 
country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear time trends. "Import capture ratio" is ratio 
of a country's self-reported total imports to corresponding reported exports of other countries to said country. 
Dependent variable in column 3 is coefficient of variation of import capture ratio across 82 product groups 
within country-year cell. See Tables 2 and 4 for notes on sample composition and other variable definitions.Table 7: Robustness checks for impact of PSI on import duties
(OLS fixed effects estimates)
Dependent variable: Ln (import duties)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification: Sample of 
countries with 15 
or more obs. from 
1980-2000
Sample of 
countries with 18 
or more obs. from 
1980-2000
Exclude countries 
with population < 1 
million 
Include outliers of 
import duties
Flexible controls 
for other tax 
revenues, tariffs
PSI * Trend 0.071 0.084 0.064 0.055 0.082
(0.024)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.025)***
PSI 0.152 0.16 0.158 0.126 0.137
(0.067)** (0.080)** (0.068)** (0.073)* (0.088)
Past PSI 0.234 0.364 0.202 0.117 0.409
(0.196) (0.223) (0.189) (0.178) (0.237)*
Observations 937 745 1,188 1,382 998
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97
Number of countries:
   Total 49 37 88 105 37
   Observed pre- and post- PSI 14 11 19 19 11
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors (corrected for clustering by country) in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and country-specific linear time trends. Regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4 include control for ln(other tax revenues). Regression 5 includes controls for 
10-piece linear spline in ln(other tax revenues) and in simple average tariff rate.Table 8: Cost-benefit calculation
Panel A: Import duties
Level effect of PSI on log import duties 0.161
Effect of PSI on annual change in log import duties 0.063
Import duties as % of imports 15.25%
Pre-program level of import duties 15.25
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Ratio of accum. 
improvements 
to fees
0 17.91 2.66 2.66 2.96
1 19.08 3.83 6.49 3.53
2 20.32 5.07 11.56 4.11
3 21.64 6.39 17.95 4.69
4 23.04 7.80 25.75 5.27
5 24.54 9.29 35.04 5.86
6 26.14 10.89 45.93 6.45
7 27.84 12.59 58.52 7.04
8 29.65 14.40 72.92 7.63
9 31.58 16.33 89.25 8.23
10 33.63 18.38 107.63 8.83
Panel B: Imports
Effect of PSI on annual change in log import duties 0.040
Pre-program level of imports 100.00
% of imports inspected 90%
PSI fees as % of value of imports inspected 1%
(5) (6) (7)
Year since PSI start: New level of 
imports




0 100.00 0.90 0.90
1 104.08 0.94 1.84
2 108.33 0.97 2.81
3 112.75 1.01 3.83
4 117.35 1.06 4.88
5 122.14 1.10 5.98
6 127.12 1.14 7.13
7 132.31 1.19 8.32
8 137.71 1.24 9.56
9 143.33 1.29 10.85
10 149.18 1.34 12.19
NOTES-- Assumed impacts of PSI on import duties and imports are from column 3 of Table 4 and column 4 of Table 6, 
respectively. Year 0 is first year PSI program has been active for at least half a year. Initial import duties as a share of 
imports calculated from 5 years immediately prior to PSI programs for the 19 countries observed before and after the PSI 



















NOTES for Figures 1, 2, and 3 – Figures refer to the specific parameterization of theoretical model described in Section 2 of text. All 
figures drawn on same horizontal scale.
Figure 1: Total import duty collections and enforcement costs
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NOTES– Plotted points are coefficients on indicator variables for each year before and after the start of a PSI program, in regression of ln(tax
collection), separately for each type of tax revenue. Panels a) and b) present coefficients from regressions for ln(import duties) and ln(other tax 
revenues), respectively. Year 0 is first year that a PSI program has been active for more than half a year. Omitted year indicator is “year -1” (year 
immediately prior to PSI start year). Dotted lines depict 95% confidence intervals. Other right-hand-side variables are: year fixed effects, country 
fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, and an indicator for observation occurring in a year after the end of a previous PSI program. Unit 
of observation is a country-year; see text for sample composition. “Other tax revenues” are total tax revenues minus import duties. 
































































Years pre- and post- start of PSI program
a) Import duties
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Years pre- and post- start of PSI program